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### 1nc shell

#### The resolution demands advocacy of a federal policy

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The affirmative’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential.

#### First is limits --- a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills --- even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable.

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs--- Key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10 If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14 I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13 Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained. Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually. When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided: A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision… The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision… It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16 John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors. We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### Second is fairness --- our argument is not a rule --- it’s an expression that what the aff said was not fair to the negative --- we have been excluded from active participation in this debate --- you’re voting against the aff for being a type of politics that doesn’t care about able opponents, which is crucial to the success of ideas. We should understand fairness as a form of agnostic politics.

**Hatab 2**, Prof of Philosophy @ Old Dominion University, (Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants**.** [25](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT25) In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. [26](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_nietzsche_studies/v024/24.1hatab.html#FOOT26) An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights**,** not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.

#### Third is truth-testing. Dialogic partners need to acknowledge the fact that we share a shared world --- this doesn’t imply consensus or shared values. But it means we need to be able to understand how what they have said affects us and vice versa.

**Hauser 06**

Gerad Hauser, 2006 (Professor of Communication and the University of Colorado Boulder. His research is in the relation between formal and vernacular rhetoric as they shape and are shaped by public spheres, "Vernacular dialogue and the rhetoricality of public opinion."

The complementarity of I and we does not mean that there is a convergence of opinion among dialogic partners, only that they inhabit a common world of concerns that requires them to take account of one another while arriving at judgments. Extrapolating from Taylor's analysis of the atomic I and molecular we of face-to-face dialogue to the more complex multilogue from which a public emerges, the same requirement of complementarity holds. The countless acts of publicly expressed opinions on contingent affairs requires the type of social cooperation- even in opposition—that occurs only when participants read the expressions of others with a degree of accuracy that permits them to ascertain their relevance to and consequences for themselves and, more importantly, the social world they share. Common understanding of this sort would be impossible without a language of common meanings. An ensemble of individuals referred to as a "public" is, when unconstrained, liable to the contentious behaviors of factions who differ in opinions and interests, as Madison's Publius warned in Federalist no. 10. A public is not necessarily a group in consensus. The supporters of New Democracy who had demonstrated in Sindagma square the week before the Greek election doubtless had internal differences over their political and economic concerns; surely their interests diverged from their partisan countrymen and women in the rural regions, the mountains to the north, and the islands dotting the Aegean. They were manifesting every sign of deep division from their counter parts supporting PASOK, but they were not unintelligible to one another as they sometimes were to American eyes and ears illiterate in Greek politics and political conventions. The thesis that human reality is socially constructed is by now almost an academic commonplace. Its widespread acceptance, however, does not alter its importance for understanding the extent to which the language available to a people determines the social world they share. For an ensemble of strangers to have a common understanding of reality requires more than a common language permitting intersubjective understanding. Common understanding entails a language that applies to a common reference world, even when our customs, preferences, and methods pertaining to that world are at odds. The bond of common meaning is not shared values and meanings but the sharing of the shared world, commonly understood even if differently lived (Taylor, 1971).

#### Our model of debate is process, not product – decision-making is learned in a safe space of competing thought experiments

**Hanghoj 08** Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of **educational gaming** cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. **Dramatic rehearsal** The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by **projecting** and **choosing between** various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible **lines of action**… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “**possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding **everyday rationality** (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “**thought experiment**” will be successful. But **what it can do** is make the **process** of choosing more **intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to **inquire into** and resolve **scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a **striking difference** between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the **actual consequences** that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or **simulate** the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “**competing** possible **lines of action**” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving **the “right” answers, but** more a question of exploring the **contingent outcomes** and **domain-specific processes** of **problem-based scenarios**.

#### And, it turns your agency claims

**Hanghoj 8** http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Thus, **debate games** require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s **dialogical** philosophy also offers an explanation of why **debate** **games** (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and **imagined scenario** both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the **outsider’s perspective** reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and **find their own voice**. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “**ideological becoming**”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing **debate scenarios**, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

### 1st case

#### The aff is an invocation of the Tyranny of Guilt --- thier over-simplification of imperialism reinforces the “west is best mindset” and causes masochism.

Bruckner, 2010 (Pascal French writer, 2010, A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism, pg. 34-36, translated by Steven Rendall, JZ)

Thus we Euro-Americans are supposed to have only one obligation: endlessly atoning for what we have inflicted on other parts of humanity. How can we fail to see that this leads us to live off self-denunciation while taking a strange pride in being the worst? Self-denigration is all too clearly a form of indirect self-glorification. Evil can come only from us; other people are motivated by sympathy, good will, candor. **This is the paternalism of the guilty conscience**: seeing ourselves as the kings of infamy is still a way of staying on the crest of history. Since Freud we know that masochism is only a reversed sadism, a passion for domination turned against oneself. Europe is still messianic in a minor key, campaigning for its own weakness, exporting humility and wisdom.6 Its obvious scorn for itself does not conceal a very great infatuation. Barbarity is Europe’s great pride, which it acknowledges only in itself; it denies that others are barbarous, finding attenuating circumstances for them (which is a way of denying them all responsibility). Thus it wants to be the sole seat of inhumanity in action and wears this evil disposition as its insignia as others wear their decorations. Even natural catastrophes do not escape our delusions of grandeur: there are always many analysts who see in the slightest hurricane, flood, or earthquake the perfidious hand of Euro-America. Regarding the tsunami in December 2004, some even saw the goddess Gaia rising from the ocean floor to punish our industrial civilization. Like prayer, self-accusation is a way of acting symbolically at a distance when one can do nothing. Megalomania without borders: by attributing all the misfortunes of the world to man, a certain kind of ecology shows an unbridled anthropocentrism that confirms our status as the “master and destroyer” of the planet. To think, for example, that tomorrow we will be able to determine whether we have rain or sunshine, that we will eclipse nature, is to relapse into the Promethean fantasy nourished by the most fanatical adepts of progress. We can, then, contest everything except our own depravity. A blatant case of imperialism in reverse. Decolonization has deprived us of our power, our economic influence is constantly decreasing, but in a colossal overestimation we continue to see ourselves as the evil center of gravity on which the universe depends. We need our clichés about the wretchedness of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to confirm the cliché about the predatory, murderous West. Our loud stigmatizations serve only to mask this wound to our self-esteem: we no longer make the laws. Other cultures know it but nonetheless continue to blame us in order to escape our judgment and call us, at the slightest tremor, “people in pith helmets telling other people what to do” (Vladimir Putin). If colonial independence’s record of achievement is at present problematic, there is no doubt that someday Africa will take off, and the Arab world as well, that they will cease to be objects of our compassion and become direct competitors, partners on equal terms. Then we will no longer be the “masters of the world” but only formerly well-off people with pale faces. The whole paradox of a sobered-up Europe is that it is **no less arrogant** than imperial Europe because it continues to **project its categories** on the rest of the world and **childishly boasts** that it is the origin of all the ills that beset mankind. Our superiority complex has taken refuge in the perpetual avowal of our sins, a strange way of inflating our puny selves to global dimensions.

### 2nd case

#### You don’t have the right to take peoples identities.

Grosfoguel, Professor Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, ‘7 (Ramon, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn” Cultural Studies, Vol 21 Issue 2-3, p 211-223, T&F Online)//JAG

Epistemological Critique The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the ‘modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system’ for the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga & Anzaldua 1983, Collins 1990) as well as thirdworld scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977, Mignolo 2000) reminded us that **we always speak from a particular location in the power structures**. Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and racial hierarchies of the ‘modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system’. As feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called this perspective ‘afro-centric epistemology’ (Collins 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (Dussel 1977) and following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldúa (1987) I will use the term ‘body-politics of knowledge’. This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. **In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis**. The ‘ego-politics of knowledge’ of Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated ‘Ego’. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a **myth about a Truthful universal knowledge** that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks. It is important here to distinguish the ‘epistemic location’ from the ‘social location’. The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consist in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemicaly like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that all knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth. Rene Descartes, the founder of Modern Western Philosophy, inaugurates a new moment in the history of Western thought. He replaces God, as the foundation of knowledge in the Theo-politics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages, with (Western) Man as the foundation of knowledge in European Modern times. All the attributes of God are now extrapolated to (Western) Man. Universal Truth beyond time and space, privilege access to the laws of the Universe, and the capacity to produce scientific knowledge and theory is now placed in the mind of Western Man. The Cartesian ‘ego-cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) is the foundation of modern Western sciences. By producing a dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim non-situated, universal, God-eyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez called the ‘point zero’ perspective of Eurocentric philosophies (Castro-Gomez 2003). The ‘point zero’ is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view, that is, the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this ‘god-eye view’ that always hides its local and particular perspective under an abstract universalism. Western philosophy privileges ‘ego politics of knowledge’ over the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ and the ‘body-politics of knowledge’. Historically, this has allowed Western man (the gendered term is intentionally used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to dismiss non-Western knowledge as particularistic and, thus, unable to achieve universality. This epistemic strategy has been crucial for Western global designs. By hiding the location of the subject of enunciation, European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination was able to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of ‘people without history’, to the twentieth century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty-first century of ‘people without democracy’. We went from the sixteenth century ‘rights of people’ (Sepulveda versus de las Casas debate in the school of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century), to the eighteenth century ‘rights of man’ (Enlightment philosophers), and to the late twentieth century ‘human rights’. All of these are part of global designs articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans. However, as Enrique Dussel (1994) has reminded us, the Cartesian ‘ego cogito’ (‘I think, therefore I am’) was preceded by 150 years (since the beginnings of the European colonial expansion in 1492) of the European ‘ego conquistus’ (‘I conquer, therefore I am’). The social, economic, political and historical conditions of possibility for a subject to assume the arrogance of becoming God-like and put himself as the foundation of all Truthful knowledge was the Imperial Being, that is, the subjectivity of those who are at the center of the world because they have already conquered it. What are the decolonial implications of this epistemological critique to our knowledge production and to our concept of world-system?

#### Their focus on crafting the self is the politics of fascism --- outwardly focused democratic participation and consequentialism are key

Zamponi 12—professor of sociology, UC Santa Barbra (SIMONETTA FALASCA-ZAMPONI, The politics of aesthetics: Mussolini and fascist Italy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/simonetta-falasca-zamponi/politics-of-aesthetics-mussolini-and-fascist-italy)

For Benjamin, the paradox was that what he called ‘the age of mechanical reproduction’, rather than fulfilling its “natural” mission of freeing people from the chains of an enchanted vision of the world - one that made people feel miniscule and in awe of authority - ended up instead becoming an instrument of domination. Liberation was countered by submission. Freed from the dogma of the Church and other institutions, thanks to the availability of information and new technologies, the so-called masses were nevertheless prey to re-enchantment, especially through new charismatic styles of politics that fed off myths and rituals: the case of Mussolini’s Italy (and, of course, Nazi Germany too). This idea of “anaesthetized aesthetics,” to use an expression by Susan Buck-Morss, perfectly captures Mussolini’s approach to politics and his role in the government of the polity. How was his politics anaesthetic? In my research of Mussolini’s writings and speeches, the trope of the politician as artist emerged as one of the strongest and most frequent, and not as a mere formula or superficial reference but as a core feature of Mussolini’s own understanding of politics. In Mussolini’s view, for politics not to be a dirty word that reflected the failing political class’s capacity for endless debates and conservative behaviour, it had to play a role much more active and daring; politics was supposed to change a society’s whole way of living and thinking. The issue was not one of mere shifts in government: the old game of political compromises and formulas. With fascism, the goal was to revolutionize the meaning of politics itself in order to construct a new Italy on the ruins of the old one. Here is where the idea of the politician as artist comes in. The artist politician destroys in order to create. “Moulding,” “sculpting,” and “shaping” were terms that became familiar in Mussolini’s discourse when he referred to the masses and their transformation into ideal fascist models. Politics was an art for Mussolini, and he liked to think of himself as a sculptor who alone could render hard material into malleable constructions, pliable artifacts. Is there anything more radical in terms of disregard for people, or more opposed to the rules of democratic participation, than this approach that considers people as things? - an approach that in my opinion overlaps with and defines totalitarianism. The second element of fascism’s aesthetic politics was the expressive means employed by Mussolini, as a result of his underpinning idea of a disciplined, organized harmonious "aesthetic" form that is supposed to define the whole of Italian society under fascism - to actualize his role as artist politician. This is certainly the more familiar, visually evident, and even at times caricatured aspect of fascism’s aesthetic politics. It encompasses the plethora of rituals and symbols, which attracted the attention of many, including Hitler as well as Stalin, especially during the early years of the regime. In part the natural outcome of a movement that wanted to distinguish itself from traditional politics, in part a reflection of the youthful character of its members, and in part an expression of cultural trends of the time, fascism emerged as a semiotically rich phenomenon. Uniforms of adherents, although not colourful, were distinctive; ritualistic ceremonies and gestures identified the special nature of the group; myths framed the cultural horizon of its followers, and so on and so forth. Such semiotic excess did not merely emerge at the origins of the movement, but continued to be augmented over time with new or newly redefined symbolic means. Their importance within the regime increased, at times exponentially, such as in the case of the Roman salute or the goose step, and of course of the myth of Mussolini, which was at the centre of this highly orchestrated ritualistic apparatus. Though shifting in style and focus over the years, Mussolini’s centrality in the fascist constellation remained unchallenged, unsurpassed, and ever growing indeed, gaining traction also thanks to the ability of the media to diffuse Mussolini’s image via the printed press, cinema, and the radio. From lion tamer to rural worker, motorcyclist, father, commander, Mussolini’s figure affirmed fascism’s value and helped build fascism as a longstanding regime. Two decades – not an insignificant stretch of time. A new Italian man This leads me to the last element of my discussion: the effectiveness of Mussolini’s aesthetic approach to politics. The question is tricky because there is no exact way to know the answer. What motivates me to raise this issue is however not so much the desire to find definite answers but the need to emphasize once again that Mussolini’s deep subscription to an aestheticized understanding of politics led him to play down, or not necessarily focus on, the outcome of his approach. Mussolini believed that the goal of remaking the Italians would naturally be attained. It was not an issue of if or how. Changes in the Italians’ gestures, rituals, ways of speaking, writing, etc. would necessarily bring about the change Mussolini was pursuing: a new Italian man would be born out of this artistic endeavour. Mussolini had undeniable faith in this project and was not very rational about it, I would underline, which again demonstrates the radical nature of his subscription to an aesthetic understanding of politics. More strategic objectives often took a back seat in his agenda, something that in different ways we find typical of the other totalitarian experiments in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Aesthetic goals were absolute and independent of any ethical issues.

# 2nc

### 2nc ov

### AT: Excluding

#### 1

B) Actual violence is inevitable without a normative system of communicative conduct

Dietz 00 (Mary, Professor of Political Science – U Minnesota, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 123-4)

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machiavellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "derivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enumerating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communicative action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engagement between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of communicative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across European cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is designed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

### at: destorys ptx

#### 2. Its better than ignoring the state --- their framework is the political equivalent of burying your head in the sand --- they cede the political.

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ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy.

There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making.

For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.

Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics.

Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251).

National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts.

In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences.

The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality.

Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray.

For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

### at: schaap

#### A framework of rules is the only way one can be liberated from a hegemonic instrumental debate space – it’s not about finding the truth behind the resolution but rather using the resolution as an objective starting point for stasis and deliberative decision making – this turns the aff

Yovel 5 (Johnathon, Ass. Prof of Law and Philosophy at the U of Haifa, "SYMPOSIUM: NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART I): MGAY SCIENCE AS LAW: AN OUTLINE FOR A NIETZSCHEAN JURISPRUDENCE," Lexis) jl

Thus the will is measured in the scope of its challenges. But the active will is not satisfied by those challenges it happens to come by. For the challenge to be worthwhile it must be the most powerful possible, and so the Person of Power must cultivate the will to power of those who are not. In debate, the Person of Power will make the best of her opponent's position, nourish it, then go after the strong points or strongest version or interpretation. Kasparov must play Karpov, then Deep Blue. The philosophical problems most worthy of engagement - and Nietzsche spoke of problems as something a philosopher challenges to single combat - are the toughest ones. Of himself, he asserts "I only attack causes which are victorious ... . I have never taken a step publicly that did not compromise me: that is my criterion of doing right." [n42](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n42) In society, the law that best serves the Person of Power is that which empowers the other to best prepare him for such "war." [n43](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n43) Law must elevate the other's own powers to the fullest of [\*650] their potential (the overman, of course, has no presupposed potential: a potential for her would be power-constraining rather than a horizon for development). The Person of Power will not rely on social norms to serve her in overcoming or in dominating: that is the way of ressentiment. Instead **she will form law that will make the best out of that which she must stand up to,** namely the others. Nietzsche is no closet-liberal: the principle of law as empowerment of the other is strictly a mean for the will to become more, for the power to will. [n44](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n44) Law does not empower the other as a subject, although through empowerment the other might discover her own power and so much the better. The other - the person enslaved by the psychology of ressentiment, be he called slave or master - needs not be empowered to become less contemptible, yet it is because of his contemptibility that he must be elevated. Empowerment of the other is the active will's maxim in the exact sense in which the elevated will categorizes natural phenomenon and shapes cognition and language - namely, creating the environment for the best possibilities for the will to cast itself in the world, both natural and social. D. Education The third model for law I wish to discuss is a social interaction to which Nietzsche devoted as systematic a study to as any, namely education. [n45](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n45) I imagine that had he ever got to working out the role of law in some future society peopled by some, yet few, <um u>bermenschen, his Untimely Meditations concerning it might have taken on analogous characteristics. For sure, education in Nietzsche is not a pleasant process, and how it precisely generates [\*651] the reevaluation of all values and the development of post-ressentiment power-psychology is not completely clear; nor is its role in guiding Man over the bridge to Overman. Zarathustra may be bringing humanity the greatest gift ever given it, but he is not sure how it can be administered and realized. Nevertheless, as an exercise, certain aspects of the model of education can be extrapolated as such. The main point about Nietzsche's approach to education (almost, if not quite a theory of education) is the following: education in its true form is not about socialization - which produces only "herd animals" - and certainly not about knowledge. Instead, the goal of education is to encourage the development, embracing, carving, etcetera - of authenticity (Wahrhaftigheit). This in fact requires shedding ideology, conventions of knowledge, and socialization, a requirement not unlike Francis Bacon's talk of the purification of thought from various "idols" generated by the public sphere (e.g., language) that cause "a wonderful obstruction to the mind." [n46](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n46) Nietzsche developed this approach to education on the background of a German society that, responding to the requirements of the social revolution and a growing state bureaucracy emphasized technical, scientific and professional (including military) instruction. "The young man learns to "grind': first prerequisite for future efficiency in the fulfillment of mechanical duties (as civil servant, husband, office slave, newspaper reader, and soldier)." [n47](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n47) Yet, all while revolting against technocratic schooling, nor is Nietzsche's program a humanistic approach to education, even when he invokes humanistic educators such as Socrates, Goethe, Schiller, and Schopenhauer as role models. Its aim is to push the student towards molding herself, coming to terms and affirming her own will to power: its goal is authenticity, not presupposed notions of virtue. As explained above, this requires overcoming representations (of knowledge, of values and notions of the good life, etc.); the goal of education is formal in the sense that it is about the construction of a free spirit, not its encumbrance with any presupposed content which, by definition, is a form of conformity. In a perforce cursory nutshell, there is a sense in which the Nietzschean process of education may be characterized as a shift from mentoring to rebellion. While liberal education and indeed any form of collective education is geared toward the production [\*652] of conformist students, Nietzschean education is about the self-discovery of power through what we may call "**constructive repression" - a developing power's encounter with a formidable one (**the latter in Nietzschean, not social, terms). An autocratic mentor may be assigned to a student, gradually oppressing her through discourse. No reactive - i.e., conscious - forces are encouraged in the student to realize and act on her situation. The student may become subservient at first, but through her active powers she begins to emerge against the mentor's manipulative power (again we encounter the theme of resistance discussed above). The struggle **is not about truth** or falsehood - still decadent, reactive concepts - but about power; and the student begins her emancipation when she realizes and experiences it as a matter of will to power rather than of normativity. To this end the educator himself never says what he himself thinks, but always what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates. He must not be detected in this dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one believes in his honesty... . Such an educator is beyond good and evil; but no one must know it. [n48](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1324663716789&returnToKey=20_T13574209687&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.103405.94089517374" \l "n48) No one shows the student the way to power - education is a tragic process and tragedy is, after all, not discourse or narrative but action. Dominated by the mentor's power, the student doesn't realize that it is all about her - that her private Zarathustra shows her, instead of telling her, the way to growth and authenticity. Ressentiment and bad conscience - Nietzsche's forms of neurosis and psychosis - are the pitfalls that await her: justifying her subjugated position and ascribing it to some normative reason other than a realization of power relations. She thinks it's his fault - ressentiment - or her fault - bad conscience - until, if all works out well, she realizes the innocence of existence and the perversion of ressentiment. The student's will then finds its active power and rebels against that of the mentor. She is not merely liberated from bad conscience and ressentiment but, at that stage, from dependence upon religious, moral (read: Kantian), social, and every other kind of entrenched normativity. That is the **beginning** of **free-spiritedness**.

### 2nc truth testing

#### The benefits of debate can only be achieved by focusing on a stable resolution---debate’s unique from a conversation among friends where tangential relevance to the topic at hand has no implication---given the multiplicity of perspectives about the resolution, formal rules are crucial

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No doubt, in the course of discussion, someone may feel that it would be wiser for the assembly to discuss a somewhat different proposition than the one specified, perhaps worded in a subtly or substantially different way. But if they want to press the point, the parliamentary rule is that they must move an amendment, changing the wording of the motion under discussion, once again in a specifically formulated way. Proceedings are then devoted to a discussion of the virtues of the amendment, qua amendment, and a vote is taken on that, before the substantive discussion is resumed. And again, we see the virtue of this way of doing things in a diverse assembly. In conversation among friends, the topic may shift in an open-ended way, and people familiar with one another have both the willingness and the ability to keep track. But in an assembly consisting of people who are largely strangers to one another, deliberation would be hopeless if there was a sense that the topic might or might not have shifted slightly after every contribution. So, although amendment processes exist, their formulaic character and the rules governing their proposal and adoption provide a way of keeping track of where the discussion is, a way of keeping track which does not depend upon implicit understandings that some of the members may not share.¶ When discussion is exhausted, a vote may be called for, and-if my experience of law faculty meetings is any indication-someone will immediately leap to their feet and say: "I'm confused. What exactly are we voting on?" In a well-run assembly, the clerk or secretary will be in a position at that stage to read out the proposition (as amended) which now is the focus of the final vote. Once again, the determinacy of that proposition, as formulated and as amended, is important to establish a sense that we are all orienting our actions in voting to the same object. It is important for me to know, for example, that what I take myself to be voting against is exactly what my opponent takes himself to be voting in favor of. Otherwise, the idea that our votes, on a given occasion, are to be aggregated and weighed against one another becomes a nonsense.¶ What I have just described is rudimentary by comparison with the processes employed in actual legislative assemblies such as the Congress of the United States. Bills are longer and more complex than the sort of motions one hears at faculty meetings. They have usually been drafted-more or less competently-in advance, and there are many stages of deliberation (including committee stages, whose proceedings may be much less formal) that bills must go through before they are adopted. And, this is to say nothing of the vicissitudes of bicamerality, conference committees, and the rest.¶ For the most part, however, these complications enhance the need for a determinate text to focus and coordinate the various stages of the legislative process. Without a text to consider, to mark up, to amend, to confer about, and to vote upon, the process of law-making in a large and unwieldy assembly would have even a greater air of babel-like futility than that which is currently associated with Congress.¶ Thus, whether we are talking about a small-scale meeting or a large-scale legislative process, the positing of a formulated text as the resolution under discussion provides a focus for the ordering of deliberation at every stage. The existence of a verbalized bill, motion, or resolution is key to norms of relevance, and key to the sense, which procedural rules are supposed to provide, that participants' contributions are relevant to one another and that they are not talking at cross purposes. Maybe, a one-person deliberative body can do without this-though even there, many of us are familiar with the mnemonic virtues of a formulated proposition in our own solitary decision-making. And maybe, decision-making in a small group of oligarchs or in a junta of familiars can do without this as well, if they can move toward consensus on the basis of conversational informality. But the sense of a determinate focus for discussion-something whose existence is distinct from the will or tacit understandings of particular members'- seems absolutely indispensable for a large and diverse assembly of people whose knowledge and trust of one another is limited.¶ VIII If there is anything to this hypothesis, then we might want to start thinking about the textual canonicity of legislation in a slightly different way. I said in Part I that one of the values most commonly associated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy: We should defer to statutes because they have been enacted by a democratically elected entity. Just as the idea of democracy is insufficient to explain why we prefer a large elected legislature to a single elected legislator, so the democratic principle is insufficient to explain the particular way in which authority is accorded to legislation in the mod- ern world, viz., by taking seriously the exact words that were used in the formulations that emerged from the legislative chamber. If I am right, we now have an explanation for the importance of the ipsissima verba which is oriented primarily to the legislators' dealings among themselves, rather than directly to the issue of their collective authority vis-a-vis the people.¶ The final step, then, in pursuit of this hypothesis would be to show how this account of the importance of a text to the legislators is connected with the authority of the text for its intended audience. Here there are a couple of lines to pursue. First, as we have seen, the existence of orderly discussion is necessary to secure whatever Aristotelian advantages accrue from deliberation in a large and diverse group. Unless the diverse experiences and knowledge of the various legislators can connect and be synthesized, it is unlikely that their interaction will produce standards that are superior to those that any individual citizen could work out for herself. The conditions for orderly discussion, then, are indirectly conditions for the legislature's authority, in the Razian sense.8 9 In other words, authority requires superior expertise; superior expertise comes from deliberation among those who are different from one another; deliberation among those who are different from one another is possible only on the basis of formal rules of order; and crucial to rules of order is the postulation of an agreed text as the focus of discussion.**¶** Second, respect for statute law is partly a matter of respect for the legislature as a forum whose representativeness is an aspect of the fairness 90 of the way a community makes its decisions. To the extent that representativeness requires diversity in the assembly, respect for that fairness is a matter of respecting the conditions under which diverse representatives can deliberate coherently. Thus, fairness-based respect for the legislature as a body may require not only that we respect the standards which it posits, but also that we respect these more formal aspects of the way in which its posited standards are arrived at- and thus that we respect the standards in question under the auspices of text-based formality.9 '

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#### This reinforces infantilism and turns their impacts.

Bruckner 10 (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 42-45, translated by Steven Rendall, JZ)

The wave of repentance that is washing over Europe and especially our main churches is salutary only if it is mutual, and other beliefs, other systems recognize their aberrations as well. Contrition cannot be reserved for the few and purity attributed, like a kind of moral income, to those who say they have been humiliated. For too many countries in Africa, the Near East, and Latin America, self-criticism is confused with the search for a convenient scapegoat that explains all their misfortunes: it is never their fault; the fault always lies elsewhere (in the West, globalization, capitalism). But this division is not exempt from racism: when tropical or overseas peoples are relieved of all responsibility for their situation, they are at the same time deprived of all freedom and plunged back into the condition of infantilism that obtained under colonialism. Every war, every crime against humanity among the damned of the Earth is supposed to be somewhat our fault and ought to lead us to confess our guilt, to pay endlessly for being a member of the bloc of wealthy nations. This culture of apologies is above all a culture of condescendence. Nothing authorizes us to divide humanity into the guilty and the innocent, for innocence is the lot of children, but also that of idiots and slaves. A people that is never held accountable for its acts has lost all the qualities that make it possible to treat it as an equal. Thus we must enlarge the circle of repentance, open it to all continents, and not confine it to Northern Hemisphere countries alone.10

#### The fact is that everybody does something bad at some point --- but placing all the blame on the West ignores the fact that the colonized can be jerks too.

Bruckner, French writer, 2010 (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 155-156, translated by Steven Rendall, JZ)

Isn’t it astonishing that the first nations that abolished slavery, after having greatly profited by it, were also the only ones that are now the object of accusations and demands for reparations? In other words, the crime is attributed only to those who have repented of it—Europe and the United States—which lost, by the way, a million of its sons for this cause in the Civil War—and who have condemned this commerce in human beings as a barbarity. In France, the Taubira law of May 21, 2002, which seeks to define as a crime against humanity only the Western slave trade, participates in this partial interpretation of the phenomenon. Why is the West and the West alone blamed, whereas the Asian and African worlds, which have never publicly apologized for it, are exonerated of all responsibility? Because the former is rich and sensitive to moral arguments: it was in the name of these arguments that, first in Britain in 1807, and then in Denmark and France, the West yielded to the abolitionists who denounced as infamous the reduction of a category of human beings to the status of “animated tools” (Aristotle), of chattels. (For the record, the first Arab Muslim state to abolish slavery was Tunisia in 1846, but the measure was not enforced until the French arrived in 1881. The Ottoman Empire abolished slavery in the early twentieth century. The slave trade was declared illegal in Yemen and Saudi Arabia only in 1962, and in Mauritania in 1980.) There is still a taboo on mentioning that there were three slave trades, the Eastern one, which began in the seventh century (an estimated seventeen million captives); the African, which provided slaves for use both in Africa and abroad (fourteen million persons); and the Atlantic, which, in a shorter period of time, led to the deportation of almost eleven million men, women, and children. Any historian who dares to discuss this is running the risk of being accused of revisionism. It was the West and the West alone that developed the abolitionist idea before it was disseminated in black Africa and in East Asia.

### \*\*\*at: forgetting bad

#### Our argument is not that we should forget the harms of the past but rather that those harms have already been repented for --- their method is grounded in injuries of the past with no guide for the future---this reinscribes exclusion and foreclosures social justice --- starting point for politics should be constructive and progressive politics.

Bruckner, 2010

(Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 140-146, translated by Steven Rendall, JZ)

What counts is knowing what mobilizes these collectivities: scorn for their equal rights, or an outrage so deep that it puts them in a state of unlimited indebtedness? Claiming a place in the public sphere by reappropriating the past, knowing and communicating, for example, the history of the Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese who died for France and were used as cannon fodder in our European wars (see Rachid Bouchared’s film Indigènes), is part of a legitimate process of self-revaluation for their children and grandchildren. Symbolic recognition by the highest state authorities can complete this process, and France would be wrong to conceal the Arab-African side of its identity.1 But there is also the danger of transforming these groups’ suffering into a kind of sanctuary, if necessary by embodying it in a law, of making it an impenetrable bastion. Heirs: traditionally that term referred to the children from good families who enjoyed a large fortune and a good education. Now the word refers to the transmission of a new patrician value: suffering, which raises us to an unprecedented aristocratic order. We are all heirs on both sides of the same barrier, perpetuating a distinction or a defect that marks us forever. We no longer create our own lives, we repeat the injuries of former times. What victimist thought resuscitates is the old religious category of the curse. How then can we avoid transforming ourselves into lobbies of professional sufferers, competing with others for market share and the martyr’s crown? Just as there are imaginary Jews, there are imaginary slaves and colonized peoples who want to drape themselves in an accursed legend and thereby win additional esteem. Thus would be reconstituted the great fraternity of the shipwrecked and defeated, confronted only by oppressors and torturers. Victimization would be a kind of savage positive discrimination, a way of giving oneself a free pass when all legal and political recourse have been exhausted. To call oneself a victim is to make oneself a candidate for exception; perhaps that is an indispensable stage that has to be passed through by a minority that is reconstructing itself and reconquering its dignity. But it is a two-edged blade. A feeling of belonging cannot be founded on a theatricalized misfortune, it has to be founded on a shared collective experience, a growing responsibility in public life, in the media, and in professions. Victimization does not produce a sectarian emphasis on difference, as supporters of the Republican model fear, it constructs conglomerates of plaintiffs, it forges ex nihilo an absent community. This allocation of prestige to the “defeated” or those who feel themselves to be defeated is ambiguous. It is a mistake to believe that making schoolchildren feel guilty in accord with the principle “your ancestors enslaved mine” will make them like the idea of human diversity any better or will seem to them anything more than a theatrical artifice.2 Just imagine little blond, brunette, or curly-headed kids coming up to each other on the playground and introducing themselves as descendants of slaves, of colonized peoples, of slavetraders, of bandits, of peasants, of beggars! Why ask boys and girls to make themselves the contemporaries of crimes that may have been committed three centuries ago by unknown people in Nantes, Bordeaux, or La Rochelle, when they themselves are allergic to any idea of slavery? In short, whereas Europe has buried its age-old quarrels and reconciled its hereditary enemies, only the slave trade and imperialism are supposed to escape history, that is, distancing, and we are supposed constantly to inject rage and anger into them, repeating like a refrain Faulkner’s famous phrase: “The past isn’t dead, it isn’t even past.”

As a result, a veritable civil war between incompatible memories is beginning, making it impossible to establish a common narrative because there will always be groups that, because of their beliefs or sufferings, will not recognize themselves in it.3 Unless there is a federating national or supranational narrative that brings all the diverse components of a country together and gives them a common impulse, the country becomes an agglomeration of black, North African, Gypsy, Antillese, Corsican, gay, etc. tribes unified by their mutual dissensions and relying on the state only as a simple mediating authority. Then identity ceases to coincide with citizenship; it is in fact what makes citizenship impossible. The French or British model may be in difficulty, but everywhere in Europe there is, as we have seen, a disqualification of the idea of the nation that renders absurd even the concept of integration. The latter is reduced to two complementary models. The freemarket model makes settlement in a country equivalent to a labor contract that can be renewed or canceled in accord with the law of supply and demand. The Third World or Christian model of hospitality requires us to welcome anyone who comes to our country, without demanding anything of him or her, in an act of pure oblation. If there are no longer any patriots or natives, there are no longer any foreigners, either, only well-off people who have a duty to help their less well-off neighbors. Only the welfare state, through the allocations it provides us, reminds us that we are still in a certain place, with a certain government. What is lacking is a symbolic adherence to a spiritual principle, the result of a singular history, and a freely accepted, voluntary association with a specific national community, with all that presupposes in the way of learning the language and being introduced to that community’s peculiar culture. It is not enough to regularize the status of thousands of immigrants, to provide them with a life and suitable work. In addition, if they want to stay in Europe, we must make them true Europeans—Spaniards, French, Italians—and this presupposes a political society sure of itself and of its values that can arrange, for example, a formal welcoming ceremony for newcomers. We blame great nations, often rightly, for their failures to absorb immigrants. But we forget that there is also a despotism on the part of the minorities, who resist assimilation if it is not accompanied by extraterritorial status.4

Still more serious is the fact that under cover of respecting cultural or religious differences (the basic credo of multiculturalism), individuals are locked into an ethnic or racial definition, cast back into the trap from which we were trying to free them. Their good progressive friends set blacks and Arabs, forever prisoners of their history, back into the context of their former domination and subject them to ethnic chauvinism. As during the colonial era, they are put under house arrest in their skins, in their origins. By a perverse dialectic, the prejudices that were to be eradicated are reinforced: we can no longer see others as equals but must see them as inferiors, victims of perpetual oppression whose past ordeals interest us more than their present merits. (The whole problem with “prides”—gay, bi, trans, Breton, black, etc.—which generally proceed from stigmatized categories, is that they imply the contrary of what they say: that one might be ashamed of what one is. It is revelatory that this expression, which comes from the politics of identity, has become a slogan for everyone. One should be proud, not of what one is and that is not up to us, but of what one does.) To Europeans, African Americans seem first of all to be American citizens, with all that implies on the cultural, linguistic, and economic levels.5 In everyday life I do not encounter “Jews,” “blacks,” or “Arabs,” which are just abstract categories; I encounter distinct persons, whom I like or don’t like, and to whom I am bound by precise affinities, but whose roots, whose pale or colored skins, and whose religious convictions play only a secondary role in my judgment of them. Individuals exist as such only when their singularity is more important than their nationality, the color of their skin, or their membership in a group.

### 2

**First is their demand to assume the role of the other --- I’ll quote their 1ac evidence here ---**

**Tormey 06** (Simon, Political Theorist based in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, “‘Not in my Name’: Deleuze, Zapatismo and the Critique of Representation”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 59 No. 1, 2006)//SK

One of the reasons, it seems, for the loose-limbed ‘anarchic’ nature of the CCRIs is the shared perception of the impossibility of generating representational structures even on a delegated basis—a point that in turn echoes Deleuze’s critique of identity. Reading Zapatista communiqués one quickly gets the sense of an acute awareness of the differences between communes, between ethnic groups, between regions, all of which makes it impossible as they see it to reduce this ‘difference’ to representational terms. So instead of declarations in the name of some collective subject or group such as ‘the poor and oppressed, ‘the peasants’ or the names of the various groups and ethnicities, the favoured expression is merely ‘the peoples of the Chiapas’. This echoes the concerns that underpins Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term ‘multiplicity’ itself reminiscent of the Spinozan term, ‘multitude’. A multiplicity is not a denumerable set such as ‘the majority’. It is the dissolution of collective categories, including the favoured formula of romantic Enlightenment, ‘The People’. A multiplicity of this kind cannot be ‘represented’ because it is a description of disaggregation. It is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, a ‘molecular’ not a ‘molar’ term, one intended to reinforce the image of combinatory dynamism as opposed to the stasis of passive aggregates. Marcos’s careful formula respects this sense of difference that he sees in his own ‘constituency’. As he puts it: In the world of the powerful there is no space for anyone but themselves and their servants. In the world we want everyone fits. We want a world in which many worlds fit. The nation that we construct is one where all communities and languages fit, where all steps may walk, where all may have laughter, where all may live the dawn. 25 This sensitivity to difference is itself reflective of the qualities Marcos exercises in his difficult position as an exemplary or iconic Zapatista. Whilst Marcos is sometimes portrayed as the leader of the Zapatistas, the reality is rather different. Firstly, the Zapatistas are insistent that they do not ‘lead’ but are merely an insurgent army subject to the wishes of the indigenous peoples. They are subject to the deliberations of the CCRIs, and thus do not lead the insurgency. Secondly, Marcos is not the leader or even a leader of the EZLN itself but merely a ‘spokes-person’ among other spokespeople (Comandantes ‘Esther’, ‘Fidelia’,‘Tacho’ etc.) Yet the question persists because of the position Marcos has attained. Clearly he is a key figure not only in the local politics of the struggles in Mexico, but in global activism generally. As one of the most ‘heard’ figures of the movement how can he not be in some sense representative? Interestingly, Marcos insists that he is a ‘mirror’ for the oppressions he finds, setting out what is already ‘there’ and adding little to it, except possibly a flair for the turn of phrase and an ability to translate homespun folklore into the language of resistance. Alternatively, he is a mere ‘face in the crowd’ in which case ‘Marcos’ is a nom de plume for Zapatismo. 26 Who he is carries less significance than what he is: one who ‘resists’. In a much quoted reply to one interviewer’s demand to know who the ‘real’ Marcos is, he replies: Marcos is gay in San Francisco, a black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a Chicano in San Isidro, an anarchist in Spain, a Palestinian in Israel, an indigenous person in the streets of San Cristóbal, a gang member in Neza, a rocker on campus, a Jew in Germany, an ombudsman in the Department of Defense, a feminist in a political party, a communist in the post-Cold War period [ … ] In other words, Marcos is a human being in this world. Marcos is every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is resisting and saying ‘Enough!’ So is Marcos not representative in some sense—representative of the ‘poor and oppressed’? Not on his view, which here echoes the point made by Deleuze and Guattari. ‘The poor and oppressed’ does not constitute a majority or a special group that can be represented. It is on latter’s term a ‘nondenumerable set’: those who remain outside the dominant majority and thus outside of representability. But it might still be objected that this is hubris to say the least. How can one person embrace or embody multiple oppressions? What does Marcos really know of these groups, and what makes him think that he can in some sense or other speak for them without transgressing his own doctrine of ‘listening’ and not speaking for? Marcos’s gesture is surely one of solidarity, as opposed to representation. As he makes clear, the struggles he is engaged in is one form of the more general struggle of otherwise voiceless minorities against superior forces. What he wants to draw our attention towards is that the struggles of ‘Marcos’ are not idiosyncratic or unrelated to other people’s oppressions. They are one instance of the struggle between what he calls ‘Power’ (or ‘Neoliberalism’) and the millions of people subject to it. This is a solidarity in negation, but a negation in a positive register, one that prefigures the creative bonds and alliances he thinks are possible between those in a process of escaping the ‘majority’. Here again we find echoes in Difference and Repetition . Describing two ways in which the philosophy of difference provides ‘necessary destructions’ of representational thought Deleuze argues that we find: that of the poet, who speaks in the name of a creative power, capable of over-turning all orders and representations in order to affirm Difference in the state of permanent revolution which characterises eternal return; and that of the politician, who is above all concerned to deny that which ‘differs’, so as to conserve or prolong an established historical order, or to establish a historical order which already calls forth in the world the forms of its representation. Deleuze’s ‘poet’ is of course Nietzsche in this passage; but Marcos seems in his ‘creativity’ to conforms to the model of an affirmative ‘power’ in terms of how he sees his own role within the movement. Marcos is not a ‘politician’, but as per his own self description, a ‘poet’. He is not denying difference, but seeking to unleash the ‘creative power’ of difference qua minorities and communities in their multiple but equivalent struggles against the ‘politicians’: those who would speak in their name, which for these purposes includes not only ‘politicians’, but also those ‘vanguards’ who think they better understand the needs and interests of the people they seek to liberate or emancipate. The anonymity afforded by the mask is thus not merely practical, but also symbolic. It ‘represents’ those who are not currently represented: the face-less, voice-less minorities—which in numerical terms is the vast majority .Thinking more generally about the socio-political ideology of Zapatismo, what becomes evident is the reluctance to commit themselves to a ‘vision’ or blueprint of how the world should be transformed, or indeed how even the Chiapas should be transformed. This again is a source of irritation for otherwise sympathetic onlookers who would like to see in the Zapatistas the vanguard of an attempt to construct a viable ‘counter-empire’ of the kind influentially discussed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their influential work Empire . Surely it is asked, there must be some notion of what the world should look like in order to mobilise people against the world as it is now? Again, the notion that ‘resistance against’ can only make sense when seen as the antonym of a ‘resistance for’, in this case in favour of a distinct political system or space is one that is challenged both implicitly and explicitly by Zapatista practice. As Marcos insists: Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not bought and paid for by a doctrine. It is … an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question: ‘What is it that excluded me?’‘ What is that has isolated me?’ … In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive … In attempting to elaborate what Zapatismo is, communiqués articulate the idea of ‘a political force’ that operates in negation to that which is, as opposed to the embodiment of something that has yet to be created. In this sense they directly eschew the idea of a government or system ‘in waiting’ as per the classic ‘putschist’ rhetoric of traditional revolutionary movements. As has often been noted, they have yet to articulate a response to the ‘land question’, which is the very issue that caused the Zapatistas to come into being in the first place. Zapatismo is ‘silent’ on this and all the other matters that have animated left radicals over the past two centuries, that have nurtured them in the ‘hard times’, and helped to maintain their faith that history is on their side. But the ‘silence’ is surely telling in positive ways. As we noted at the outset, this is a political force that prefers not to ‘speak’, but rather to ‘listen’ and provide what Marcos terms an ‘echo’ of what it ‘hears’. As Marcos notes, this would be: An echo that recognises the existence of the other and does not overpower or attempt to silence it. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice, yet speaks with the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound, yet opens itself to the sound of the other. An echo […] transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that turns itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, before Power’s deafness, opts to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, acknowledging itself to be equal in its desire to listen and be listened to, to recognizing itself as diverse in the tones and levels of voices forming it. To Marcos this is a different kind of political practice. It is one that insists that there are no a priori truths that can be handed down to ‘The People’; there is no doctrine that has to be learned or spelled out; there is only ‘lived experience’. Zapatismo is a political force that is concerned with the means by which people can be ‘present’ as opposed to being represented, whether it be by political parties, ideologies, or the other familiar devices and strategies that have prevented voices being heard. To quote Marcos, what they are struggling for is a world in which ‘all worlds are possible’. Similarly In The Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle , Marcos declares (on behalf of the Zapatistas) that: ‘we aren’t proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world; an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class, or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle’. 30 Their struggle is one to permit other conceptions of the world to come into being. Of course this is punctuated by a view of what it is that such spaces require: the obliteration of party machines, of the bloated and antique structures of representation that clog Mexico’s political system; but the point is such strictures are regarded as the basis upon which a genuine political process can take place. What is left out is any ‘final’ account of justice, equality or democracy. Contrast Zapatismo in other words, with traditional revolutionary rhetoric and more particularly with the communist struggles of the past with their tightly knit, disciplined hierarchies built on a thorough going utilitarianism that is prepared, as Trotsky once bluntly put it, ‘to break eggs to make an omelette’. In Zapatismo we find on the contrary a sentiment that insists that all the ‘eggs’ are of value. It is ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ for the singular voice that animates this struggle against representation, not a desire to fulfill the historical or foreordained destiny to which all voices are or will be subject.

#### They assume the role of the oppressed, even when they do not know that role --- this is seen in the call for your assumption of the role of the German Jew, the Maquiladoras Worker

**Ranciere 98 (**Jacques, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School ,Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy Pg 126)

The transformation of the democratic stage into a humanitarian stage may be illustrated by the impossibility of any mode of enunciation. At the beginning of the May '68 movement in France, the demonstrators defined a form of subjectification summed up in a single phrase: "We are all German Jews." This phrase is a good example of the heterologi­cal mode of political subjectification: the stigmatizing phrase of the enemy, keen to track down the intruder on the stage where the classes and their parties were counted, was taken at face value, then twisted around and turned into the open subjectification of the uncounted, a name that could not possibly be confused with any real social group, with anyone's actual particulars. Obviously, a phrase of this kind would be unspeakable today for two reasons. The first is that it is not accurate: those who spoke it were not German and the majority of them were not Jewish. Since that time, the advocates of progress as well as those of law and order have decided to accept as legitimate only those claims made by real groups that take the floor in person and themselves state their own identity. No one has the right now to call themselves a prole, a black, a Jew, or a woman if they are not, if they do not possess native entitlement and the social experi­ence. "Humanity" is, of course, the exception to this rule of authentic­ity; humanity's authenticity is to be speechless, its rights are back in the hands of the international community police. And this is where the second reason the phrase is now unspeakable comes in: because it is obviously indecent. Today the identity "German Jew" immediately signifies the identity of the victim of the crime against humanity that no one can claim without profanation. It is no longer a name available for political subjectification but the name of the absolute victim that suspends such subjectification. The subject of contention has become the name of what is out of bounds. The age of humanitarianism is an age where the notion of the absolute victim debars polemical games of subjectification of wrong. The episode known as the "new philosophy" is entirely summed up in this prescription: the notion of massacre stops thought in its tracks as unworthy and prohibits politics. The notion of the irredeemable then splits consensual realism: political dispute is im­possible for two reasons, because its violence cripples reasonable agree­ment between parties and because the facetiousness of its polemical embodiments is an insult to the victims of absolute wrong. Politics must then yield before massacre, thought bow out before the unthinkable. Only, the doubling of the consensual logic of submission to the sole count of parties with the ethical/humanitarian logic of submission to the unthinkable of genocide starts to look like a double bind. The dis­tribution of roles, it is true, may allow the two logics to be exercised separately, but only unless some provocateur comes along and lashes out at their point of intersection, a point they so obviously point to, all the while pretending not to see it. This point is the possibility of the crime against humanity's being thinkable as the entirety of exter­mination. This is the point where the negationist provocation strikes, turning the logic of the administrators of the possible and the thinkers of the unthinkable back on them, by wielding the twin argument of the impossibility of an exhaustive count of extermination and of its unthinkability as an idea, by asserting the impossibility of presenting the victim of the crime against humanity and of providing a sufficient reason why the executioner would have perpetrated it.